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Abstract
The Internet of things (IoT) is a system that utilizes
the Internet to facilitate communication between
sensors and devices. Given the ubiquitous nature of
IoT devices, it is seemingly inevitable that IoT would
be used as a conduit to transform healthcare. One
such medical IoT (mIoT) device that is revolutionizing
healthcare is the medical implant device. These mIoT
implant devices which control insulin pumps,
cardioverter defibrillators and bone growth
stimulators have redefined the way patient data is
accessed, and healthcare is delivered. These implant
devices are a double-edged sword. While they allow
for the effective and efficient noninvasive treatment of
patients, this external communication makes the
medical implants vulnerable to cyberattacks
synonymous with IoT devices. As a result, privacy and
security vulnerabilities have surfaced as pronounced
challenges for mIoT devices. This work summarizes
and synthesizes the inherent vulnerabilities associated
with mIoT devices and the implications regarding
patient safety.
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implantable bone growth stimulators [4-6]. Leading
factors driving the medical implant market include the
aging population, technological advances, increased
knowledge of medical implant technology, and an
increase in degeneration medical conditions [6].
Responses to a recent trade journal survey show
cardiovascular and orthopedic medical implant
devices are believed to account for more than half of
the medical implant devices projected to make the
most impact in fighting disease and improving patient
care [6]. While medical Internet of Things (mIoT)
devices such as medical implants have the propensity
to advance healthcare, they also present unparalleled
security challenges [7].

1. Introduction
Internet of things (IoT) is loosely defined as the
communication between interconnected sensors and
devices designed to utilize the internet for the
collection, analyzation, and exchange of data. Keeping
with the current trajectory, it is inevitable that IoT will
give us the ability to collect and analyze data related
to nearly every facet of our lives [1]. IoT is one of the
driving factors that is fueling a new era of medical
diagnosis and intervention [2, 3]. One such IoT device
that is revolutionizing healthcare is the medical
implant device. For instance, these devices control
insulin pumps that allow for the administration of
medication, cardioverter defibrillators that treat
patients who show signs of cardiac arrest, and
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/71082
978-0-9981331-4-0
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Figure 1. Generic Medical Implant Device
Threat Model
Implant devices are a double-edged sword.
Medical implants allow for the transmission of
medical data to physicians and medical facilities.
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These devices allow doctors to perform advance
medical procedures, such as modifying the implant
device without invasive surgical procedures. They also
allow for the near real time transmission of the
patient’s physiological data in treatment centers such
as the ICU as well as remotely. Although the benefits
these devices yield to patients are numerous, they also
expose patients to cyberattacks [8]. It is the
communication with systems outside of the patient’s
body that make medical implants vulnerable to
potential attacks [9]. While cyberattacks are common
and seemingly expected in network-connected
devices, their results, when applied to medical
implants, could be life-threatening and lead to a loss
of privacy [10]. As shown in Figure 1, a hacker can
attack the implantable medical device or the wireless
channel between the patient and medical personnel.
Hacking medical devices is not uncommon and has
been going on for over a decade. Reasons for hacking
a medical device include hacktivism, financial motives
such as extortion, and political [11, 12]. In 2018, NHS
systems, a pacemaker manufacturer, was breached by
a ransomware attack designed with the intention to
extort money from the company [13]. While there are
no published cases of physical harm or loss of privacy
to medical implant device patients, the potentially fatal
harm that could result from a cyberattack is cause
enough for concern.
While a device’s security requirements should
reflect the risk associated with the device, this is rarely
the case. While security is often a reactionary
environment in practically every technological
environment, security is rarely a design goal in the
medical implants industry [9, 14]. Implementing
adequate security begins during the foundational
development phases when choices like which
operating system to use are made [15]. There
seemingly exists a gap in the security safeguards being
implemented in the medical device industry and other
industries with high-security levels already in place
[16]. Given the importance of these devices, they are
a logical target for cyberattacks. As the importance of
these devices continues to rise, so will the level of
threats against these devices. However, there seems to
be an inverse relationship between threat levels and
preventative measures. Hackers are seemingly
outpacing manufacturers, leaving providers at a
disadvantage concerning security vulnerabilities [17].
There are several challenges to securing medical
implant devices. Synonymously with other IoT
devices, medical implant devices have very little
computing power and memory. These limitations
severely hinder the ability of manufacturers to secure
these devices [18]. The limitation on battery size also
places constraints on security measures that can be

implemented. Measures such as encryption are
constrained because of the strain they will place on the
battery [19]. This poses severe authentication
challenges for manufacturers. Furthermore, while
system updates are non-invasive, performing some
secure system updates can be cumbersome. These
updates often require patients to make appointments in
order for implants to receive security updates [9].
While medical implant manufacturers struggle to
design devices hardened enough to prevent
cyberattacks, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has failed to produce regulations regarding the
safeguards such as security updates that need to be in
place [20, 21]. Instead of regulations, the FDA has
issued pre and post guidance that focuses more on
labeling and documentation to inform patients of
cybersecurity issues and encouraging manufacturers to
address cybersecurity issues throughout the life of the
product rather than on providing technological
guidelines to address requirements [22, 23]. Questions
also exist as to whether device manufacturers and
cloud service providers who collect protected health
information on their own and not as associated with
entities that are covered by HIPAA are also covered
by HIPAA [24].

2. Study Review Process
The objective of this review attempts to survey and
summarize the current threat and vulnerability
landscape that is faced by health practitioners, medical
organizations, and hospitals that use medical IoT
devices and manage healthcare-related information on
their networks, what academic research has been
published, and what attention has been brought to the
potential problem. The information from this work is
derived from scientific databases and relevant industry
documents and publications. The most appropriate
documents related to medically implanted IoT devices
were selected. Through dependable sources such as
IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Economics
Engineers), Scopus, Sage Journals, Science Direct, the
authors have access to a large number of academic
articles as well as industry analysis. These databases
were selected from technical and medical literature.
The search was limited to peer reviewed journals and
conference articles from the last five years.
Publications such as books and book chapters were not
given consideration. The author used the query
“(‘internet of things’ OR ‘medical internet of things’)
AND (‘security’ OR ‘privacy’) AND (‘healthcare’ OR
‘mhealth’ OR ‘m-health’ OR ‘medicine’)”. The
documents that were analyzed are detailed in Table 1.

Page 3851

Table 1. Articles analyzed in this study
Title
[25]

[26]

[11]

[13]

[27]

[12]

[28]

[29]

[30]

[31]

[32]

Description of Contribution
The authors focus on a case example of an
implanted medical device cybersecurity
threat. The actions taken by stakeholders is
outlined and a summary of the position of
societies in response to the events is given.
A framework, based on international
common criteria, for fostering security in
wireless health devices. The authors aspire
to provide a way forward that stimulates
security, public trust, and confidence.
Explores the possible risks of hacking for
patients using cardiac implant devices and
outline what can be done by multiple
stakeholders to improve cybersecurity.
This study seeks to determine whether or not
it is feasible to hack NHS pacemakers.
Experiments in this study were performed
from the perspective of an average hacker,
not of one with intimate knowledge of how
to hack a pacemaker.
The authors seek to develop a new protocol
to facilitate wireless communication
between implantable medical devices and
remote controls that are used to control
minor day to day operations.
Investigates the role of IoT in healthcare by
exploring security and vulnerability issues,
attacks, and solutions.
Examines the challenges and requirements
of designing authentication protocols to
secure the wireless transmission of sensitive
data from implantable medical devices.
Reviews the regulatory frameworks
addressing medical devices in the US,
Europe, Canada, and Taiwan. The work also
examines the status of reaching a global
consensus on regulating medical devices.
The goal of this work is to increase
awareness related to the security of medical
IoT devices by identifying exploits and
evaluating their impacts against a
pacemaker automatic remote monitoring
system (PARMS).
Examines and summarizes the literature
related to using IoT based principles in
implantable medical devices.
This document assists scholars and
practitioners in communicating the extent
and scope of the risks of cybersecurity and
in advancing education and research in the
medical IoT field.

[33]

[34]

[35]

[36]

[37]

[38]

[39]

[40]

[41]

[42]

[43]

The authors analyze multiple scenarios in
order to understand the actual consequences
of IoT based healthcare applications.
This article discusses the background and
issues of possible attack vectors that are
likely to be hacked and provides protection
strategies that can be implemented.
Illustrates
the
measures
healthcare
organizations can implement until FDA
regulations are established to safeguard
patient safety.
Addresses authentication limitations by
proposing an energy-aware signature that is
appropriate for embedded medical devices
with limited resources.
Relevant information regarding the security
of brain implants is addressed, several
mechanisms that can be utilized by hackers
to gain unauthorized access are identified,
and limitations rooted in IoT devices are
discussed.
Reviews
the
existing
threats
of
cybersecurity risks in implantable medical
devices and proposed technical solutions.
This review article focuses on the
challenges, threats, and solutions related to
privacy and safety matters related to
implantable medical devices.
This work introduces the problems
associated with designing implantable
medical devices with cybersecurity as a
significant part of the design goal.
Examines the cybersecurity vulnerabilities
associated with implanted medical devices
and argues they are a national security risk
which needs a joint effort between the
government and private sector to protect
patient safety.
Implements a low cost, energy efficient IoT
medical system.

Current implantable medical device
vulnerabilities are discussed. Security tests
and
demonstrations
completed
by
researchers are presented.

3. Study results
As healthcare continues to increasingly utilize
digital communication measures such as the internet
and wireless communication, it will increasingly
become more and more susceptible to cyberattacks.
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Risks to healthcare from unintentional threats have
long been known, but more recently, risks from
intentional threats have been confirmed [21]. Due to
the nature of these devices, security issues should also
be considered safety issues to patients. Implanted
medical devices not only capture and transmit
physiological data to medical decision-makers, but
they also perform tasks designed to regulate organs.
Implanted medical devices that have been
compromised can cause harm to a patient or even
perform actions that are potentially profound.

3.1. Known cybersecurity vulnerabilities
acknowledged by the governing authority
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is
the federal agency that is responsible for protecting the
public’s health. As related to this study, the FDA is
tasked with ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security
of medical devices used by patients. The FDA has
acknowledged that while the digital communication
features present in medical devices increase the ability
of medical providers to treat their patients, they also
increase the risk of cybersecurity threats [22, 23]. As
medical devices are being connected to the internet,
medical facilities, and other medical devices,
manufacturers must remain diligent about protecting
their customer’s health. Manufacturers and healthcare
providers must remain diligent about implementing
the recommendations to remediate the vulnerabilities
that have been reported by the FDA so that the safety
of patients is ensured (Table 2). As of yet, the FDA is
not aware of any patient injury or death that is
associated with a medical implant device
cybersecurity incident [25]. However, it has been
noted that devices are not checked for tampering
following the death of a patient [13] .

Table 2. Known medical device cybersecurity
vulnerabilities
Vulnerability and Description
SweynTooth: Bluetooth Low Energy
exploit to crash, deadlock, or bypass
security on devices [44]
URGENT/11: Allow an attacker to
remotely take control of a medical
device and change its function [45]
Medtronic
MiniMed:
Potential
cybersecurity risks in Medtronic
MiniMed insulin pumps [46]

Date
Issued
3/3/2020

10/1/2019

6/27/2019

3/21/2019

Medtronic
ICDs
or
CRT-D:
Cybersecurity
vulnerability
in
wireless
technology
used
to
communicate between Medtronic’s
implantable cardiac devices and home
monitors [47]
St. Jude’s Medical implantable
cardiac devices and Merlin@home
Transmitter: these cardiac devices
contain devices that are vulnerable to
cybersecurity intrusions and exploits
[48]
Hospira infusion pump system: these
systems that continuously deliver
anesthetic or therapeutic drugs can be
programmed remotely through a
healthcare providers LAN [49]

1/9/2017

5/13/2015

The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) has release documentation
designed to assist medical providers with securing
their devices on an enterprise level network. SP 18008 focuses on wireless infusion pumps and lists the
multiple security guidelines designed to help secure
these devices [50]. While written specifically for
wireless infusion pumps, the guidelines are applicable
throughout the entire medical implant device
ecosystem. However, absent from the document are
the specifications and security standards necessary to
meet these security assurances.

3.2. Medical
Cyberattacks

Implantable

Devices

and

Figure 2 illustrates the medical implantable
devices and cyberattacks landscape. The integration of
IoT into healthcare has brought tremendous advances
in patient treatment options. The interconnectivity of
the devices provides for remote monitoring by
healthcare providers and wireless communication.
This interconnectivity also introduces a portal by
which cyberattacks can occur.

3.2.1. Cardiac devices
One area that has seen a significant amount of
research is that of implanted cardiac devices. Multiple
cardiac device exploits are being researched:
In battery drain attacks, attackers seek to suddenly
deplete the battery of the implanted medical device
[11, 25]. Researchers are currently working on
implementing an energy-efficient, low power solution
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for IoT ECG monitoring devices that don’t
compromise performance [42]. Wirelessly recharging
batteries have been proposed to alleviate the battery
constraints, currently limiting security measures [40].
However, this is a novel idea that requires more
experiments.

Code injection attempts proved to be unsuccessful.
This was attributed to the medical device utilizing
some form of a checksum [13].
Replay attacks attempting to transfer a data packet
from one pacemaker to another subsequently failed
[13].
Implantable medical devices like pacemakers not only
send data but receive data also. This allows hackers to
target these medical devices, leaving patients
vulnerable to Distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks [12].

3.2.2. Neuromodulation
Brainjacking refers to the unsanctioned control of
a medically implanted brain implant. There are
multiple options for hackers implementing a
brainjacking attack [37]:
Blind attacks do not require the attacker to have any
knowledge about the patient. Blind attacks include
cessation of therapy, battery drainage, administering
the overcharge of stimulation, and stealing patient data
by eavesdropping.
Targeted attacks require personal knowledge about the
patient. Targeted attacks include the modification of
stimulation, impeding motor function, inducing pain,
altering impulse control, and modifying emotion and
alertness.

Figure 2. Medical Implantable Devices and
Cyberattack Landscape
Attack Graph Modeling is an attack graph visualizing
the cybersecurity risks of remote health monitoring
systems communicating with implantable devices
[30]. The experiment showed that pacemaker
automatic remote monitoring systems are prone to
cyberattacks and require security measures to protect
the patient’s data.
Only the communication module was affected by
signal jamming. The device did not exhibit any strange
behavior, but if jamming was performed during the
update session, the update data could be corrupted
[13].

3.2.3. Implantable mobile devices
Zheng et al. found the following vulnerabilities in
pacemakers, IMDs, and insulin pump systems [43]:
Doctors can gain access to an implantable mobile
device without being required to authenticate as long
as they have the same manufacturer and are the same
model as a device for which they have a programmer.
Communication between the programmer and
implantable mobile device is not encrypted or is
encrypted with a static key. The information related to
the static key is stored in the implantable mobile
device and can be retrieved at the beginning of the
session.
Off the shelf programmers that can be used to access
implantable mobile devices.
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3.3. Security and attacks
Figure 3 illustrates the security and attacks
vulnerability landscape. Currently there are no
standards governing security in medical devices. The
current lack of security standards not only impacts
patients but other stakeholders as well [13].
Government regulations for security, such as HIPAA,
the FDA, and NIST, offer guidance instead of actual
regulations. Guidance instead of regulation can offer
patients using devices that have the approval of these
agencies a false sense of security [26]. Security
standards should be created through collaborative
work between experts from different fields that
represent
the
stakeholders
involved
[31].
Recommendations from the private sector to realize a
national security standard include a national system
designed to share information related to medical
device cybersecurity [41]. In order to understand the
specific security requirements that are needed, a
system-wide view of the security issues must be
assessed [33]. The FDA has recently begun to initiate
an action plan designed to move towards a more
security-based approach to the design of medical
devices [29, 35]. While these are not regulations, this
is a step in the right direction.

Figure 3. Vulnerability Landscape
3.3.1. Security issues
Multiple issues exist with medical devices. These
devices are often omitted from routine scans for IT
equipment, causing them to be omitted from software
updates and patches. This exacerbates vulnerabilities
on the medical facility’s network because of the
difficulty patching [39].
3.3.2. Unpatched Devices
When reviewing the high-profile St. Jude Medical
(currently Abbott) case, Alexander et al. found that
although the firmware update was non-invasive and
was completed in approximately three minutes, the
majority of patients with Abbott pacemakers elected
not to receive the update designed to correct the known
cybersecurity vulnerability [25]. Factors that may have
led to a decreased update rate include possible

complications resulting from the update and the life
expectancy of the device. The FDA reported that of the
devices were updated, 0.62% experienced issues with
the update process that required resolving, and 0.14%
of the patients experienced stimulations or discomfort
during the update process. The age demographic that
was more likely to update were younger males with
relatively new pacemakers. The age of the pacemaker
is a determining factor when deciding to complete
firmware because the life expectancy of the device is
five to ten years. Patients with older devices had
smaller windows in which the vulnerabilities were a
threat. Although the “crash attack” and “battery drain
attack” were performed on Abbott’s pacemaker, these
cybersecurity risks extend to other medical devices
that connect to the internet to facilitate remote
monitoring and programming. A study conducted by
Jackson et al. [32] found there to be a breakdown
between information about vulnerabilities being
relayed to patients. A step towards securing devices
and protecting patients is to overcome the culture of
non-communication that seems to exist between the
multiple stakeholders.
3.3.3. Authentication
While the report detailing Abbott’s vulnerability
lacked details, it did explicitly mention the use of
unauthenticated wireless communication [34]. An
analysis conducted by Challa et al. [28] found that for
implantable medical devices to function properly,
authentication protocols must be designed to be
lightweight with minimum processing requirements.
When analyzing the wireless communication scheme
utilized between an implantable medical device and
the remote control used for daily non-critical
functions, Belkhoja et al. [27] realized the lack of
proper authentication measures. An authentication
protocol that relies on plain text messages was
proposed in order to avoid high computational costs,
such as those common with encryption. Ozmen et al.
[36] proposed a low energy digital signature designed
for authenticating implanted medical devices. By not
using the ephemeral public key in Schnorr-type
signatures, and instead using a constant-size public
key, they were able to secure an 8-bit AVR
microcontroller. The implementation of multi-factor
authentication has also been proposed to alleviate
implantable medical device security issues [38]. This
is considered an easy implementation being that
biometric information from the patient can be used.
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4. Security Requirements Needed for
Medical Implant Devices
The dynamic access permissions needed in the
implantable medical device ecosystem require security
solutions to be scalable and robust. The integrity and
confidentiality of patient data and patient safety lie at
the core of the security requirements of medical
implantable devices. Patient privacy and safety must
be preserved while data transfers to medical personnel
remain easy to manage [51]. Data transfers should be
encrypted from end to end during the transfer of
configurations, commands, and private health data
[52].

5. Future Research Directions
Conflicting recommendations currently exist
regarding updating medical implant devices. Factors
such as the age of the patient are often considered
when determining whether to recommend a firmware
upgrade. While the FDA has taken a firm stance on
firmware upgrades on some implantable devices, such
as pacemakers, manufacturers are taking a more lax
approach and recommend considering more patient
specific details such as the age of the device, the level
of dependence on the pacemaker, and patient
preference be considered before mandating a firmware
upgrade [25]. Governing agencies have directed
manufacturers in the right direction, but they have
failed to properly define the standards and goals
required to ensure the level of assurance that should be
maintained for such life sustaining devices.
Also absent from the literature and governing
agencies is a method by which to evaluate medical
implantable devices. There is no certification in place
to assure the safety of these devices. As a way forward,
standards and certifications based on rigorous security
testing will help establish and quantify the level of
assurance required for these life saving devices.
Given the push to allow patients to play a decisive
role in the firmware update process, patient education
is of the upmost importance. Patients need to be made
aware of the security issues and threats associated with
medical implant devices so they can make informed
decisions and hopefully be more proactive in keeping
devices updated and secure. With the lack of
regulations in place, patients must be armed with the
power to make better decisions concerning the
firmware and security risks associated with their
device.

6. Conclusion
In this paper we reviewed the current threat and
vulnerability landscape being faced by stakeholders
that use medical implant devices. Medical implant
devices are revolutionizing healthcare. These devices
allow for remote monitoring, and some administer
therapy as needed. By using the Internet to facilitate
communication between mIoT sensors and devices,
medical practitioners are exposing their patients to
vulnerabilities shared with IoT devices. The external
communication used to control and receive data from
these devices makes the medical implants vulnerable
to cyberattacks.
As a result, privacy and security vulnerabilities
have surfaced as pronounced challenges for mIoT
device. While the benefits of mIoT devices are
bountiful, we have reached a pivotal moment where
the continued use of these devices requires the
remediation of security vulnerabilities. While
guidance is being provided by government agencies
such as the FDA, regulations formed by a joint effort
between stakeholders is needed. While no patient
injuries resulting from cyberattacks have been noted,
the time to act is now while this is still the case.
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